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In this paper we argue that autobiographical memory (AM) activity across sleep and wake
can provide insight into the nature of dreaming, and vice versa. Activated memories within
the sleeping brain reflect one’s personal life history (autobiography). They can appear
in largely fragmentary forms and differ from conventional manifestations of episodic
memory. Autobiographical memories in dreams can be sampled from non-REM as well as
REM periods, which contain fewer episodic references and become more bizarre across
the night. Salient fragmented memory features are activated in sleep and re-bound with
fragments not necessarily emerging from the same memory, thus de-contextualizing
those memories and manifesting as experiences that differ from waking conceptions.
The constructive nature of autobiographical recall further encourages synthesis of these
hyper-associated images into an episode via recalling and reporting dreams. We use
a model of AM to account for the activation of memories in dreams as a reflection
of sleep-dependent memory consolidation processes. We focus in particular on the
hyperassociative nature of AM during sleep.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, dreaming, memory consolidation, sleep, continuity hypothesis,
hyperassociativity
The Context of Autobiographical Memory
Whilst memories for very specific instances are referred to as “episodic” (e.g., Tulving, 1983,
2002), memory and information for and about our own experiences more generally falls under the
umbrella term of “autobiographical memory” (AM; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway,
2001, 2005, 2009; Conway and Loveday, 2015). AM is a representation of experiences (episodic
memories and associated details) and information (semantic knowledge) related to the self. As such
it engages all aspects of the declarative memory system (Nadel, 2008; Renoult et al., 2012). Current
conceptualizations of episodic memory, which break from earlier theories (e.g., Tulving, 1983),
suggest that episodic memories are detailed summary accounts of short time-period experiences,
which are forgotten within 24 h unless they are consolidated during sleep and subsequently become
linked toAMs (Conway, 2009). Life stories, or autobiographies, are created over time into a narrative,
compiled of personally salient, emotional and everyday experiences, along with facts and knowledge
about ourselves (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Similarly, dreams are narrative simulations
of autobiographical episodes (Montangero, 2012), and it has been suggested that narratives are the
“basic manner in which the brain organizes experiences” (Pace-Schott, 2013, p. 2)—hence both
waking AM and sleep mentation are organized in this manner. Crucially, such narratives are not
composed of precise replicas of specific (episodic) experiences from the life-course. Rather, they are
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constructed and changed over time, much as an author may edit
a novel in order to improve its readability and clarity. We propose
that AM functions comparably across sleep and wake (Horton,
2011a,b; Malinowski and Horton, 2014a).
We use this account of AM to describe and explain the
construction of dreams. Furthermore we explore the processes
of sleep-dependent memory consolidation with a particular
emphasis on the enhancement, stabilization, and integration of
AMs. In this paper we propose a model in which AM experiences
are broken down into constituent fragments, reactivated “offline”
during sleep, and re-combined via hyperassociativity (e.g.,
Llewellyn, 2013) into a novel experience. This gives rise to
dreaming. We argue that these processes of sleep-dependent
memory consolidation crucially rely on AM functioning, in
contrast to alternative models, which do not address the multi-
modality of memories. We emphasize we constructive nature of
AM retrieval, recognizing (i) that memories change considerably
over time, and (ii) that sleep can enhance AM by breaking down
and re-combiningmemory elements, re-activating salient features
and thus consolidating them via repeated activation. As such
sleep-dependent AM consolidation functions to de-contextualize
information, rendering salient features more retrievable following
a period of sleep. In this paper we outline each of these processes
in critical detail.
We will begin by reviewing the activation of AM across sleep as
well as waking periods, exploring the inclusion of AMs in dreams.
We then explore the activation of AM fragments in sleep and
how they are hyperassociated. Next we examine the relevance of
such hyperassociativity to processes of sleep-dependent memory
consolidation, and finally propose a model of AM consolidation,
which dreams can usefully reflect.
Constructive Memory
The constructive and malleable nature of AM renders it
notoriously error-prone. Memories for personal experiences may
change over time in relation to personal goals (Conway, 2001),
so to align with current conceptions of the self (Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) or as some function of decreased emotional
reactivity (Walker and Skowronski, 2009; Ritchie et al., 2014).
In terms of the latter, the Fading Affect Bias describes the
reduction of negative emotion associated with an AM over
time and has been evidenced in dreams as well as waking
events (Ritchie and Skowronski, 2008). Furthermore rich, false
episodic memories about one’s past are easily induced (Shaw
and Porter, 2015). Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) argue that
this fluid autobiography operates under a self-memory system,
in which an executive function of current personal goals filter
the retrieval of long-term knowledge and experiences about one’s
own life. As such, retrieving autobiographical experiences is an
active process and reflects the flexibility of the cognitive systems
underpinning it.
Such a dynamic view of recall is not often acknowledged,
particularly in the memory consolidation literature. This is
perhaps not surprising, given that exploring the changes in
AM over time is resource-burdensome and methodologically
challenging. Nevertheless, this fluid account of AM acknowledges
involvement of both semantic (personal knowledge) and episodic
systems within declarative memory (Renoult et al., 2012),
and therefore may align well with more recent models of
memory consolidation (see Memory Consolidation in Sleep) and
reconsolidation (Alberini and Taubenfeld, 2008).
As opposed to AMs, distinctions between episodic and
semantic memory systems have instead dominated experimental
paradigms as they are much more easily manipulated, despite the
presentation of word lists as representative of episodic experiences
being low in ecological validity. Nevertheless, an understanding
of the processes underlying AM construction—and consequently
an understanding of the ways in which humans make sense
of their own life stories and selves—relies in part upon an
understanding of both episodic and semantic memory processes.
(For a comparison betweenAMs and EMs seeConway, 2009.) The
key processes are encoding, storage and retrieval. Much attention
has been focused in recent years on storage as an active process of
consolidation and re-consolidation, and it is this that we consider
in this paper, in particular in terms of how sleep can enhance AM
consolidation.
Incorporations of Memories into Dreams
and the Continuity Hypothesis
One’s autobiography is made up of experiences from across the
lifespan also including thoughts, concerns and dreams. We argue
that AMoperates across all states of consciousness, withmemories
being accessible at times involuntarily (e.g., Berntsen, 1996). The
characteristics of autobiographical recall (Conway, 2005) typify
the flexible and fluid nature of memory retrieval, which is often
overlooked in traditional experimental paradigms.
An extension of this view is that AM operates “offline,”
during sleep and all its composite stages. Indeed this reflects
the “continuity hypothesis” (Hall and Nordby, 1972; Schredl and
Hofmann, 2003; Domhoff, 2011; Schredl, 2012; see also Horton
andMalinowski, 2011);most broadly that there is overlap between
cognitive processing (amongst other things) across sleep and
wake. Most notably, such overlaps can be measured by comparing
various aspects of (memories for) dreams to (memories for)
waking experiences. A traditional view is that dreaming, and thus
dream memory, is somehow deficient in comparison to waking
memory (Crick and Mitchison, 1983). However as recalling both
dreams and waking memories engage the same autobiographical
system, some studies have demonstrated considerable overlap in
the retrievability of dreams and waking experiences (Botman and
Crovitz, 1990; Kemp et al., 2003; Grenier et al., 2005; Horton
and Conway, 2009; Parke and Horton, 2009; Horton, 2011a,b,
2014, see also Graveline and Wamsley, 2015). Furthermore
differences between waking AMs and dreams may result from
methodological challenges, rather than actual differences. That is,
waking AM is not flawless or even particularly accurate, although
it is often deemed to be superior in accuracy and recallability
than dream memories (see Chapman and Underwood, 2000).
Unfortunately direct comparisons cannot bemade between dream
memories and waking AMs, as the validity of systematically
sampled AMs can be verified whereas memories for dreams are
the closest to an actual dream experience one can sample.
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Nevertheless there is a wealth of evidence showing the
continuity of AM across sleep and wake in terms of content
(e.g., Stickgold et al., 2000; Schredl and Hofmann, 2003; Schredl
et al., 2006), and consciousness and cognition (e.g., Graveline and
Wamsley, 2015; Kahan and LaBerge, 1996, 2011; Kahan et al.,
1997). As such the sleeping brain can reflect one’s personal life
history to a similar extent as waking life processes and behaviors
can. One notable method for exploring the presence of AMs
during sleep involvesmeasuring the incorporation of wakingAMs
into dream reports.
Three overarching mechanisms have been consistently
identified to operate to determine the likelihood of a waking
experience appearing in dreams: its emotionality (intensity as
opposed to valence), its age (see Section “Is Dreaming a Reflection
of the Processes of Sleep-Dependent Autobiographical Memory
Consolidation?” on the day residue and dream-lag effects),
and its personal salience. Additionally there seem to be further
mechanisms that underpin the likelihood of those experiences
appearing as a more holistic representation or a fragmentary one,
and across different periods of sleep:
(i) Emotionality: Generally dreams are more emotional than
waking memories, and this effect remains when recall
bias is controlled for (Schredl and Doll, 1998; Malinowski
and Horton, 2014b). This may result from the preferential
incorporation of emotional AMs into dreams (Horton et al.,
2011) as well as the heightened activity of the limbic
system during (rapid eye movement, REM) sleep. In some
cases intense and negative memories appear in dreams
episodically, under conditions of post-traumatic stress (e.g.,
Hartmann, 1996).
(ii) In only very rare cases do truly episodic memories feature in
dreams (Fosse et al., 2003; Schwartz, 2003; Malinowski and
Horton, 2014a).
(iii) Self-representation: current self-images have been shown to
be incorporated into dreams, reflecting the activity of the
working-self (Horton et al., 2009); part of the self-memory-
system model of AM functioning (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005).
(iv) More generally the number of self, semantic and episodic
references vary across sleep-stage (see Foulkes et al., 1989),
with each aspect appearing more fragmentarily, manifesting
as increasingly bizarre, across the night (Hobson et al., 2000;
Malinowski and Horton, 2014c). Concurrently the extent
to which waking-life references appear in the dream in an
abstract (opposing literal) way increases both across the
night (Wamsley et al., 2010a), and over longer time periods
(Blagrove et al., 2011b).
(v) Personally salient experiences may be preferentially
incorporated (Malinowski and Horton, 2014b) and the age
of these memory traces may be somewhat predictable (van
Rijn et al., 2015).
The non-episodic manifestation of waking AMs into dreams
has beenwell noted (as based on Fosse et al., 2003;Malinowski and
Horton, 2014a). Fosse et al. (2003) originally noted that episodic
“replay” of waking life experiences was so rare in dreams that
there must exist a functional dissociation between REMdreaming
and episodic memory. Rather than truly episodic experiences
being “replayed,” as we would experience the recollection of an
episodic memory during waking, elements of AMs feature heavily
in dreams (Malinowski and Horton, 2014a), and may reflect
the relative attenuation of frontal systems during (all stages of)
sleep. According to Malinowski and Horton (2014a) whole, intact
episodic memories are not useful information, therefore they
are not replayed in dreams in this manner. We propose here
an alternative function of AMs appearing in a more fragmented
fashion during sleep: for salient fragments to be activated in
a different combination, thus consolidating those features to
improve their future retrievability in any context or situation that
necessitates them.
Although autobiographical elements fromwaking life appear in
dreams, experiencing a dream is often comparable to experiencing
or thinking about something in the present. That is, the
ability to reality monitor, or identify that a dream is a dream
as distinct from waking life perception, is attenuated (unless
experiencing lucidity). The dreamer typically engages with the
dream-environment from a first-person perspective, is capable
of thinking (McNamara, 2000), feeling (e.g., Schredl and Doll,
1998) and a host of other sensory experiences (Horton and
Conway, 2009). Consequently measuring the apparent activation
of fragmentary AMs in dreams seems incongruous with the
fluid experience of dreaming, which is continuous, holistic
and not unlike waking consciousness. Reconciling these views
involves appreciating (i) that AM fragments may not be the
sole constituents of a dream, (ii) that AM fragments are bound
together into holistic narrative experiences (Montangero, 2012;
Pace-Schott, 2013) giving rise to a multi-sensory experience, and
(iii) that some cognitive processes engaged during waking may
result in the synthesis of fragmentary dream elements at the
point of recalling and re-telling a dream (see Horton, 2014).
Indeed many models of consciousness recognize this quality of
unifying disparate cognitive mechanisms and features (e.g., Baars,
2002).
Consider the following example of a dream recorded by a
participant in our study (Malinowski and Horton, 2014a). The
participant dreamt that she was in a back garden (of the house
she grew up in), with a man (who was a character from the
TV series “Heroes” which she had been watching), and he was
choosing a bottle of wine (which was an activity she herself was
used to doing). She later went into the kitchen and talked to a
beautiful woman (who she believed to be a happier, more stable
version of herself). This dream incorporates various elements of
autobiographical information, both from the past (the childhood
home) and arguably the future (the woman that she would like to
become). Fragments of information about characters, the setting,
the conversation, et cetera, have been taken from waking life from
across a range of time-points, and have been re-bound into a
novel experience. This differs substantially from experiencing a
dream in which whole waking life episodic memories feature, as
that would involve the characters, settings and conversations (for
instance) to play out together in exactly the same way as they
had been experienced during waking (Horton and Malinowski,
2011).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 8743
Horton and Malinowski Autobiographical memory consolidation in the dreaming brain
There is evidence that memory de-fragmentation (Payne et al.,
2008b) and re-binding (Payne et al., 2009) occurs during sleep
and that autobiographical recall processes further encourage
the synthesis of fragmentary dream elements upon morning
awakening (Hobson and McCarley, 1977; Horton, 2014). This
further emphasizes the continuity of the AM system across
functioning across sleep and wake.
We next propose that the appearance of re-boundAM elements
in dreams is functional: to de-contextualize the salient features,
as part of a process by which information can be identified as
salient (in line with Stickgold andWalker, 2013).We return to this
explanation in Section “Memory Consolidation in Sleep.”
Hyperassociativity and Bizarreness
We argue that the process by which AM elements are re-bound
in dreams occurs as a result of the hyperassociative nature
of sleeping cognition (Stickgold et al., 1999; Llewellyn, 2013).
Hyperassociativity, whilst rarely explicitly defined, refers to the
increased activation of weakly semantically related concepts
and networks, following the activation of a specific concept
or memory (Stickgold et al., 1999). It therefore concerns a
form of cognitive processing and has been widely proposed to
illustrate typical processing within dreaming and, specifically,
REM sleep (Antrobus, 1993; Hartmann, 1996; Stickgold et al.,
1999; Hobson, 2002; Cai et al., 2009; Levin and Nielsen,
2009; Walker, 2009; Walker and Stickgold, 2010; Llewellyn,
2013). Specifically, the connectivity between associations can
be made between memories that would be considered loosely
associated during waking. Hartmann (1996, 2010a,b) argues that
the associativity between activated memories can be modeled
on a continuum with focused, waking thought at one end,
increased associativity during daydreaming or meditation, for
instance, and loose, or hyper, associativity featuring during
dreaming. Hartmann (1996) proposes that the function of
dreaming hyperassociativity is to process and weave emotions
into more stable networks of prior experience, and we review this
view elsewhere (see Malinowski and Horton, submitted). Whilst
we recognize that such emotional memory assimilation during
sleep is an important function of sleeping cognition (Malinowski
and Horton, submitted), we recognize that hyperassociativity
contributes to the selective processing of other, emotionally-
neutral memories, also.
The function of this could be to allow specific fragments
of waking experiences to be selectively reproduced, perhaps
played out in a novel or bizarre context, rendering them context-
free and subsequently increasing their inter-relations with other,
more loosely-associated memory fragments. EMs, which are by
definition context bound, engage hippocampal regions. AMs,
instead, can be context-free and the advantage of this over
time is that previously learned information is easily retrieved in
any context, facilitating accessibility. Hyperassociativity involves
the activation of information via a semantic network (e.g.,
McClelland and Rumelhart, 1985). The activated memories may
be elements of experiences and may trigger the recollection of a
full EM, though this is unlikely given (i) the loose and therefore
disorganized nature of hyperassociativity, (ii) the lack of frontal
activity during sleep, and (iii) the typical transfer of memories
from hippocampal to cortical regions during sleep (Squire and
Alvarez, 1995; also see Memory Consolidation in Sleep).
As noted previously, the selective fragmentation of memory
elements during sleep followed by the re-binding of memory
elements give rise to a holistic experience of dreaming, despite
the re-bound elements often being disparate, implausible or
impossible. In one study, Montangero (2012) found that 81%
of dreams contained abrupt and complete changes of dream
events, concluding that dream content has a “coherent but
unexpected” (p.162) nature, alluding to the disparate yet narrative
structure of dreams. Such odd or novel associations result from
hyperassociative processing and some authors argue that this gives
rise to positive experiences of insight, creativity and problem
solving either during or immediately following a dream (see
Barrett, 2012, for a summary). As such the hyperassociative nature
of sleeping cognition could account for the discontinuities of
form, context, time or location that are often reported in dreams,
more commonly referred to as “bizarreness.” Indeed it has been
suggested that bizarreness arises out of the joining together of
disparate elements (often from waking life; e.g., Revonsuo and
Tarkko, 2002; Levin and Nielsen, 2007), which is also indicative
of hyperassociativity.
Potential Functions of Activated Memory
Fragments
Whilst some theorists argue that the creative insight gained
from the novel arrangements of familiar stimuli within dreams
might be a function of dreaming, there is an additional growing
consensus and body of evidence implicating the role of memory,
in particular improvements in recall, in relation to sleep and
dreaming. These two potential functions of dreaming may be
related. Given the inextricable links between AM and dreaming,
we consider the AM system to be instrumental in the selective
consolidation of memory during sleep, and in the associated
formation of dreams. The fragmentation of AMs during sleep
and subsequent re-combination of these (in dreams) not only
provides novel arrangements and potential insight, but also
involves the re-activation of salient features, thus consolidating
those elements. We draw on other models of fragmented memory
during sleep/dreaming to inform the development of our own
model.
Levin andNielsen (2007, 2009) and Levin et al. (2010) proposed
the AMPHAC/AND model of dreaming. The acronyms refer
to the neural circuits involved in the activation of relevant
memories, emotional in this case, and their consequential fear-
extinguishing function. Themodel accounts for the fragmentation
of AM elements and their recombination into novel permutations,
as described above, though with the emphasis on playing out
emotional elements in a new context so to reduce the associated
negative emotion (almost always fear). This theory accounts for
the bizarreness so typical of dreams, the regular emotional content
of dreams (Schredl andDoll, 1998) and the reduction of emotional
intensity of repeated dream sources over time (e.g., seeCartwright,
2010, for a summary;Walker and van derHelm, 2009). The theory
is therefore comprehensive and strongly supported by empirical
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data linking emotion regulation, processing, and dreaming (see
Malinowski and Horton, submitted, for a thorough review).
However, there are some aspects of sleep-dependent memory
processing that the model does not account for, namely the links
between sleep and memory consolidation, and the activation of
positive as well as negative (non-fear-based) emotions (Schredl
and Doll, 1998). Thus the AMPHAC/AND model acknowledges
some of the trends of memory fragmentation and re-binding that
occur during sleep, but offers an explanation for this based on
emotional-processing rather than broadermemory activation and
consolidation.
There is a great wealth of evidence implicating emotional
arousal as a mediator of the sleep-memory relationship (see
Malinowski and Horton, submitted, for a review). As such Levin
et al. (2010) emphasis upon this variable is appropriate, Future
models need to acknowledge the role of emotionality in sleep-
dependent memory consolidation in healthy, as well as clinical,
populations. The previously mentioned Fading Affect Bias (e.g.,
Ritchie et al., 2014), in which the negative affect associated with
a memory fades over time, was demonstrated for dream elements
(Ritchie and Skowronski, 2008), reflecting further continuity in
AM over sleep and wake as well as the fragmentation of AMs in
dreams. The de-coupling of AMs from their emotional context
has been demonstrated elsewhere (e.g., Payne et al., 2008b) and
may indicate one of at least two possible mechanisms: firstly
that emotional arousal associated with an AM is a marker of
its salience, thus its need for consolidation; secondly that the
associated emotional arousal clouds the consolidation process,
thus extracting the negative affect from the remainingAMpurifies
the remaining elements for subsequent processing. A possible
secondary process concerns the addition of associated positive
affect with an AM over time, as part of the constructive recall
process, in which experiences are retrieved in line with current
conceptions of the self (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Whilst the fading affect bias exemplifies the continuity of AM
across sleep and wake, it does not propose a specific model by
which these relationships exist.We next consider amemory-based
account of memory activation in sleep and dreams and bear in
mind the likely mediating role of emotion.
Johnson (2005) proposed that the content of dreams reflects
memory activation which serves the purpose of developing
“context memory.” Johnson argued that information is initially
learned within a specific context and then later decontextualized.
This is hypothesized to occur over the life-course, with the
apparent need for more REM sleep at birth taken as being
supportive of this claim. There are three main limitations to this
view. Firstly context memory is defined extremely vaguely and
never operationalized. Context memory may refer to relational
memory or sematic-association networks that pervade other
literature and cognitive models (e.g., McClelland and Rumelhart,
1985), but this is unclear. Secondly Johnson draws parallels
between REM sleep and dreaming, which is a largely-redundant
and out-dated idea, given the wealth of evidence that dreaming
can be sampled from non-REM periods (e.g., Foulkes et al.,
1989) and that REM does not always give rise to dreaming (e.g.,
Solms, 2000). Thirdly, whilst we might indeed initially learn
of experiences in a context-dependent manner, it may not be
advantageous to do so. Take for instance the experience where
we cross a road and have an unnervingly close encounter with
a speeding car. It would be logical to extract and consolidate
the elements of that experience on the basis of future need. In
that case, that vehicles (not just cars) may pose a threat to our
safety. As such there is a need to retrieve this useful information
and apply it to future road-crossing scenarios, i.e., by being
careful and attentive of oncoming vehicles. According to Johnson’s
theory, the context of road-crossing could pose a general
threat and that context-bound detail would be consolidated
during REM sleep. However, evidence shows that emotional
aspects of visual memories (scenes) can be decoupled from
their broader contexts and selectively consolidated during sleep
(Payne et al., 2008b). So experiences can be broken down into
fragments, each perhaps evaluated on the basis of emotionality
or arousal, and activated individually. This move away from
episodic consolidation aligns not only with our proposals
concerning the fragmentation of autobiographical, rather than
episodic, experiences (see, also Malinowski and Horton, 2014a)
but also broader empirical illustrations of learning showing
the “R-K shift”—a move from episodic to semantic retrieval
of the same learned items over time (Dewhurst et al., 2009).
Furthermore sleep-dependent memory consolidation processes
generally propose that memories become less episodic and
more semanticized, as reflected by their decreased hippocampus-
dependency over time (Nadel andMoscovitch, 1997;Marshall and
Born, 2007), and that the activation of more episodic memories
tends to occur during slow wave (non-REM) stages of sleep. Thus
Johnson’s ideas concerning context memory seem largely at odds
with the evidence for sleep-dependent memory consolidation and
the associated fragmentation of activated memories appearing in
dreams.
To continue with the road-crossing example, we can assume
that memory consolidation serves the purpose of enhancing the
retrievability of important aspects of an experience. This would
necessitate identifying and then extracting salient features of that
experience. Subsequently this would break down the episode
into smaller units, and as such de-contextualizing it. The salient
features would be identified as such, either by being re-activated
or being associated with arousal of some kind, forming part of
the consolidation process. The result would be that consolidated
memory fragments would be better integrated into pre-existing
networks and being more easily retrieved in times of need. To
continue with this example, the recollection that vehicles may
pose a threat could be applied to other potentially threatening
contexts. We therefore propose the opposite to Johnson (2005)
in that functional de-contextualization and fragmentation of
memory experiences leads to enhanced memory. In order to
appreciate this, let’s briefly review our understanding of memory
consolidation during sleep, then how that may relate to dreaming.
Memory Consolidation in Sleep
Memory consolidation refers to the stabilization and integration
of information into long-term memory networks (Marr, 1970).
This may be measured either by an increase in performance
in a memory task (enhancement) or a lack of a reduction in
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performance (maintenance). We focus here on consolidation at
a systems-level of brain and cognition, rather than synaptic-
level changes over time, as the systems level reflects the
activation and engagement of different brain regions, which
can provide insight into the cognitive processes involved in
consolidation. The standard model of consolidation (Squire and
Alvarez, 1995) proposes that memories become hippocampal-
independent over time, with the time-course of this process
varying depending on the complexity of the memory though
ranging from hours to weeks. In contrast themultiple trace theory
(Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997) emphasizes the distinct processing
of different kinds of declarative memories, in that episodic
memories always remain somewhat hippocampal-dependent
whilst semantic memories become independent. We will briefly
critique these in light of the processing of AMs here.
Our understanding of the time-course of [hippocampal–
cortical] memory consolidation comes in part from cognitive
neuropsychology, namely patient studies of amnesics, as well
as from cognitive neuroscience and animal lesion studies. The
latter show a sharper decline in temporally graded retrograde
amnesia compared to humans, spanning up to weeks as opposed
to years (see Frankland and Bontempi, 2005, for a brief review).
According to the standard view there is coordinated activation
of recent memories across hippocampal–cortical networks, which
leads to a gradual strengthening of cortico-cortical connections.
In turn these render all new memories independent from
the hippocampus and to be gradually integrated with pre-
existing cortical memories (Squire and Alvarez, 1995). A
feature of this standard view is that such activation occurs by
replaying the original experience in some form (Marr, 1970).
The alternative, multiple trace theory, approach to systems
consolidation emphasizes the different networks involved in
processing episodic (and therefore detailed autobiographical)
memories from semantic memory (Nadel andMoscovitch, 1997).
This view draws on evidence that contextually-rich episodic and
spatial information within memory almost always activates the
hippocampus. Thus consolidation of these memories differs from
the cortical networks involved in the retrieval ofmore semantic, or
non-declarative, knowledge. The multiple trace theory therefore
has weight in that it addresses the differences between context
or experience-based memories, and knowledge, though adds a
layer of complexity to understanding the processing of most AMs,
which comprise both episodic and semantic elements (Renoult
et al., 2012).
Whilst both accounts of systems consolidation imply that
memories can be set down into relatively stable structures, it is
widely acknowledged that suchmemories can be subject to change
and refinement over time (Alberini andTaubenfeld, 2008). Indeed
our comprehension of the AM system (e.g., Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) serves as a reminder that retrieved memories are
rarely recalled truly episodically. Rather, fragments of information
about an experience, perceptions of it and information
gained since an experience will be mixed in with the original
experience, leading to different kinds of memory integration and
transformation, such as gist extraction and insight generation
(Payne, 2010; Wamsley, 2014). In this way memories are
ever-changing. This is likely true of all kinds of memories, such as
procedural knowledge (learning how to drive a car for instance) in
addition to autobiographical experiences, for which construction
is already a well-documented feature. “Re-consolidation” refers
to the processes whereby recalling a memory re-activates and
slightly changes it, requiring it to be re-integrated into ever
refined semantic structures (Nader, 2003). Thus the time-course
of consolidation processes reflects the malleable nature of
remembering. Consolidation is not instantaneous, which falls in
line with this view. Rather it occurs over hours, days, weeks and
perhaps even longer (see Frankland and Bontempi, 2005).
Sleep is largely seen to be the state during which most memory
consolidation takes place (see Payne et al., 2008a, for a thorough
review). During sleep external stimuli are not perceptible, unless
salient or loud enough to rouse the sleeper. Here the brain enters
a reflexive state in which thoughts and experiences are internally
generated (e.g., Maquet, 2000). Thus consolidation allows for
previously encoded and accessible memory traces to be activated
in some form without the interference of new stimuli. Alternative
theories of sleep-dependent memory consolidation such as Crick
and Mitchison (1983) promote the idea of the brain requiring
downtime in order to process and sort what has been perceived
before, and that sleep provides the ideal environment for this to
occur. However, considering sleep-dependent consolidation as an
“offline” process hints at passivity, which is misleading. Rather,
a current body of research highlights the selective activation
and processing of salient features of memories and experiences.
Identifying the kinds of memories selected for activation, and
how they may be broken down into constituent parts can provide
insight into the larger-scale processes of memory consolidation in
the sleeping brain. In time this may lead to specific and perhaps
predictable hypotheses concerning dream content, for example
that dream content will reflect emotionally intense waking-life
experiences (Malinowski and Horton, 2014b).
Researchers are beginning to question which specific neural
circuits are strengthened during sleep, and which features of a
memory are preferentially retained over time. Many researchers
argue that emotional features of a memory are retained (e.g.,
Holland and Lewis, 2008). Others have found a more general
personal salience effect (e.g., van Rijn et al., 2015). Recently sleep
has been shown to enhance memory features expected to be of
future relevance, with specific slow-wave sleep features (spindles
and slow oscillation activity) being associated with preferential
consolidation (Wilhelm et al., 2011). Similarly intended actions,
or goals, are more likely to be carried out following sleep
(Diekelmann et al., 2013). Taken together there appears to be at
least two levels of selectivity involved: a basic level inwhich arousal
at activation might indicate whether a memory feature is deemed
sufficiently salient to warrant future processing, and a higher-
level process in which some more personal method of selectivity
is engaged, on the basis of individual need or assimilation into
an autobiographical goal hierarchy. Further research is certainly
required here, though Stickgold and Walker (2013) review and
emphasize the active selectivity of consolidation processes in
their “triage” theory, which acknowledges in part the higher-
level processes. Lewis and Durrant (2011) propose a model of
sleep-dependent consolidation of schematic information, or gist
extraction. Here the activation of different memories during
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 8746
Horton and Malinowski Autobiographical memory consolidation in the dreaming brain
sleep leads to overlapping and therefore repeated activation of
specific memory fragments, rendering those fragments subject
to greater processing and consolidation. Whilst this view may
seem contradictory to Stickgold and Walker’s (2013) view in that
it is much more passive, with activation frequency determining
consolidation, it may account for sleep-dependent processing at
a later stage than the processes of selectivity outlined in the triage
theory. This could, perhaps, occur later in the course of the night’s
sleep.
Alternatively, both systems could operate in parallel and
refer to episodic (Stickgold and Walker, 2013) and semantic
(Lewis and Durrant, 2011) consolidation, respectively. We believe
that memory consolidation involves both the strengthening of
traces representing the episodic details of experience, and the
parallel integration of information extracted from experience
with previously acquired semantic knowledge. In this view,
episodic experiences and semantic knowledge are simultaneously
broken down for processing by the same overarching AM
system. Hippocampal activity reflects the activation of unique
representations of episodic experiences, while cortical activation
reflects semanticized and integrated information. As AM involves
the activity of both declarative memory systems, it requires the
processing and consolidation of experiences episodically first and
more semantically later, though some experiences always retain
their episodic nature. There is evidence to suggest that emotional
memories, in particular, retain such episodic features. We will re-
visit this idea in Section “IsDreaming a Reflection of the Processes
of Sleep-Dependent Autobiographical Memory Consolidation?”
when we consider the time-course of memory incorporation and
activation in dreams.
Contributory Roles of SWS and REM
Thus far we have focused largely on sleep-dependent memory
consolidation as if sleep is a homogeneous state, although
we have briefly referred to slow-wave-sleep in the preferential
consolidation of episodic memories and REM in more semantic
memory (Foulkes et al., 1989; Rauchs et al., 2005). REM has also
been heavily implicated in the processing of emotional memories
(Wagner et al., 2001). The profile of sleep across a typical night
shows a greater density of slow-wave activity in the first half of
the night, and more REM later. This may reflect the sequence
of sleep-dependent memory processing. Generally, slow wave
sleep involves the reactivation of experiences from the day, then
those experiences are broken down and emotional, and/or salient
aspects selectively processed, during REM.
Furthermore during non-REM, there is evidence for gist-
extraction and schematic representation (Lewis and Durrant,
2011; Tamminen et al., 2013), with further evidence for problem-
solving and insight benefitting from sleep compared to wake
(Wagner et al., 2004), perhaps benefitting specifically from
REM (Cai et al., 2009). These effects can be summarized as a
de-contextualization of originally episodic experiences. During
REM however the memory aspects that require future use
and/or retrievability are selected according to some mechanism
(Stickgold and Walker, 2013), re-bound with other fragments
leading to novel permutations and creative insight, and are
further consolidated. It is during these stages, and/or later in the
night of sleep, that particularly emotional, important and future-
relevant aspects of information appear preferentially in dreams
(Malinowski and Horton, 2014b). We might assume, therefore,
that emotional salience acts as a marker for activating memory
fragments during REM sleep, that were decontextualized during
the preceding non-REM stages of sleep, which together result in
heightened retrievability of relevant memory fragments, ready for
future autobiographical use (Malinowski and Horton, submitted).
Schwartz (2003) offers an explanation for the fragmentary
appearance of EMs (as AMs) in dreams: as recent EMs are
hippocampus-dependent (Marshall and Born, 2007), the
information flowing from hippocampus to cortex during slow-
wave sleep reflects the activation of more episodic information
(engaging the hippocampus). However, during REM the
information flow is blocked, with cortical-hippocampal flow
increasing instead. Thus older, more semanticized memories
(being more neocortex-based) feature more prominently. This
is somewhat unclear as to why memory fragments appear more
during REM, as opposed to there being merely fewer episodic
references, however the switch in flow between hippocampus and
neocortex could in part give rise to the interrupted and bizarre
activation of memory fragments. Similarly, the increase in levels
of cortisol across the night, peaking in the early hours of the
morning, may also underlie the increasing levels of bizarre across
the night (Payne, 2010).
AsAM ismulti-faceted, comprising both semantic and episodic
elements (Renoult et al., 2012), it likely relies on consolidation
from a full night of sleep and perhaps even and several iterations
of sleep cycles over many nights. Furthermore Paller and Voss
(2006) emphasize the cross-cortical storage across both sleep and
wake, of declarative memory systems. This serves as a reminder
of the complexity of both the memory and sleep systems involved
in the encoding, consolidation, retrieval and re-consolidation of
the majority of autobiographical information that we encounter
in our daily, and nightly, lives.
Is Dreaming a Reflection of the Processes
of Sleep-Dependent Autobiographical
Memory Consolidation?
The field of dream science has begun to address the experiential
aspects of sleep-dependent memory consolidation (e.g., Blagrove
et al., 2011c; Desseilles et al., 2011; Horton andMalinowski, 2011;
Payne andNadel, 2004; Horton, unpublished). Thismay in part be
due to the relatively challenging nature of manipulating AMs in
the laboratory, compared with, for instance, episodic memories
for word lists or images. It may also be due to the complexity of
the AM system, comprising both episodic and semantic elements
over time. Nevertheless the AM system does account in theory for
the constructive and changeable nature of recollection of personal
experiences over time, and largely falls in line with systems of
consolidation and re-consolidation, as described above.
There exists only a small body of empirical work on which
to base the theory that dreaming reflects AM consolidation
during sleep. We have already briefly summarized the trends
depicting the incorporation of AMs into dreams (see Constructive
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Memory). However, many of these studies have investigated the
memory sources of systematically-sampled dreams from a sleep-
lab, at specific points in time. A fuller picture of the time-course
of sleep-dependent consolidation can be sought by exploring
the time between experiencing something in waking life and
subsequently dreaming of it.
There are two broad trends: the day residue effect, which
reflects the tendency to dream about experiences that occurred
during the previous day and occurs in 65–70% of dreams
(Nielsen and Powell, 1992), and the dream-lag effect (Nielsen,
2004; Nielsen et al., 2004; Blagrove et al., 2011a,b; van Rijn
et al., 2015), which accounts for the tendency to dream about
experiences that took place around a week (5–7 days) prior to the
dream. The factors by which the dream-lag effect is produced are
beginning to be identified, with REM-sleep providing the most
reliable environment (Blagrove et al., 2011a) andmemory salience
increasing the likelihood of circaseptan (i.e., approximately
week-long) incorporation (van Rijn et al., 2015). Explanations
of dreaming, and in particular dreaming of specifically-aged
experiences, are thus far largely only hypothetical (see discussions
of Wamsley et al., 2010a; Murkar et al., 2014; Wamsley, 2014; van
Rijn et al., 2015) and none yet have managed to account for the
specific time-course of sleep-dependent memory consolidation
processes. In part this reflects the variability in the time-course
of setting down a memory into a specific, stable and long-term
memory structure, aswell as the complex nature ofmeasuring this.
NeverthelessMarr (1970) proposed that consolidation rhythms
guide the hippocampal-dependent store of the day’s events,
which maps on to day residues appearing in dreams. Similarly,
the circaseptan rhythms of consolidation (see Frankland and
Bontempi, 2005)might reflect the comparably circaseptan dream-
lag effects. However, the resurgence in dream-lag explorations
are bringing about a fuller picture of the factors affecting
incorporation of AMs into dreams, even if there is as yet no
empirical evidence either that memory consolidation takes a week
for salient experiences, or that these processes reflect the dream-
lag effect directly or indirectly.
An alternative method of exploring the relationship between
dreaming and sleep-dependent memory consolidation is that
dreaming trends could map on to specific effects of memory
enhancement following sleep. For instance, the increased
likelihood of dreaming of experiences relevant to waking life
during slow-wave sleep as opposed to REM (Baylor andCavallero,
2001) aligns with the tendency for episodic memory gains to
be associated with slow wave sleep rather than REM (Rauchs
et al., 2004; Smith, 2004). Similarly, Dumel et al. (2015) have
recently found that infrequent dream recall is associated with low
performance but high overnight improvement on a procedural
(mirror-tracing) task. This mode of investigation attempts to link
dreaming behaviors with consolidation trends. One challenge
of this method is to demonstrate the distinction between being
able to recall or report a dream, and actually dreaming. That
is, any measure of dreaming needs to be validated somehow.
Additionally, could one dream because they learn better, or learn
better because they dream?
Two additional studies (de Koninck et al., 1990; Miller and
Horton, unpublished) have attempted to link directly the content
of consolidated information in sleep with dream content. de
Koninck et al. (1990) attempted to correlate the proficiency of
learning a new language with dreaming of that new language,
finding that individuals (in a sample of four) who improved
their language learning incorporated the new language into their
dreams earlier and more extensively than those who made little
progress. This design has been extended by de Koninck’s team in
a range of studies and makes use of language incorporations as a
clearly operationalized andmeasurablemode ofmemory/learning
incorporation into dream mentation.
The study by Horton involved exploring links between daily
autobiographical experiences and dream content, finding that
AMs that were incorporated into dreams were better recalled
3 weeks later than AMs that had not been incorporated into
dreams. One criticism of this methodology is the difficulty in
deciphering whether dreaming reflects memory consolidation, or
whether memory improvements can be documented as a result of
recording dream experiences which comprise a consolidated AM,
thus activating and rehearsing those AMs in the process. However,
indices of rehearsal were recorded and controlled for, and effects
of memory improvement in line with dream trends remained.
Nevertheless, methodological challenges still exist in this field (see
A Model of AM Consolidation).
Overall empirical work attempting to link dreaming with
memory consolidation is gaining momentum. Concurrently
theoretical accounts of the relationships between memory
fragmentation, hyperassociativity and memory consolidation are
gaining prominence. Llewellyn (2013; Llewellyn and Hobson,
2015) has proposed one such theory, in which a function
of dreaming of fragmented memory sources is to activate
association networks, which lead to “elaborative encoding” and
subsequent specific enhancement of episodic memory. Llewellyn’s
theory recognizes that dreams contain fragmented AMs and that
those fragments are synthesized into a new image comprising
hyperassociated fragments, with links being activated during
sleep between elements that would not typically be linked
during wake. Llewellyn proposes several novel ideas, such as the
mechanisms by which hyperassociations are “junctioned” within
the hippocampus, and that the increased activation of association
networks leads to elaborative encoding. Similarly,Wamsley (2014)
has been pioneering in her championing the case for considering
dream content in sleep-dependent memory research.
We step away from the emphasis on episodic memory,
noting that the formation of unitary dream images comprising
memory fragments from perhaps several different experiences
from waking, are not vastly different from the construction of
AMs in waking life in the self-memory system (Conway, 2009).
Thus we instead see the AM system as a guide for the construction
of memory fragments into unitary images across both sleep and
wake (indeed all stages of sleep, albeit operating under slightly
different conditions over the sleep–wake cycle).
A Model of AM Consolidation
We have thus far reviewed the evidence for the involvement of
AM across sleep and wake, noting that models of AM emphasize
the re-construction of fragmentary pieces of information and
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FIGURE 1 | AM consolidation model. Waking experiences are
schematically represented as a circle, each containing numerous
constituent fragments. Individual elements (such as characters, colors,
objects present, sounds, etc.) feature alongside an action (such as shouting at a
colleague) and a context (such as the environmental setting and an emotional
tone). Focused waking cognition involves the selective activation of semantic
associations to some of the fragments. The corresponding dream involves the
synthesis of different fragments (elements, actions and a context, plus their
possible associations) taken from previous waking experiences. Each of those
fragments could elicit a hyperassociation. The consolidated elements are
those that have been repeatedly or strongly activated. They remain preferentially
accessible following sleep.
experiences at recall. The continuity of theAM system across sleep
and wake, largely measured by dream studies, highlights that AM
should be acknowledged in models of sleep-dependent memory
consolidation. Here we emphasize not only that AM can elucidate
memory consolidation processes, but also that AMs can benefit
from sleep-dependent consolidation.
We therefore propose a model of AM consolidation during
sleep, which is depicted schematically in Figure 1.
As events are experienced, they contain several multi-modal
elements, which can each be measured and broken down. Such
elementsmay reflect units or features, such as characters involved,
details of the setting, sounds or conversations, actions, colors,
emotions, thoughts or other sensory experiences. A feature of
waking cognition is focussed thought (e.g., Hartmann, 2010a,b).
As such whilst semantic associations are activated during waking,
executive functions largely ensure that resources are allocated
to goal-directed tasks. Experiences, information and perceptions
fromwaking are broken down into unitary elements and activated
offline during subsequent sleep. Each element activates associates,
which may be somewhat distantly-related to the original element
via hyperassociativity. Dreams reflect the activation of these
elements and their associates. Furthermore dreaming cognition,
in contrast to focussed-waking thought, lacks goal-directed
control. Coupled with hyperassociation, semantic associations
may be activated and take over consciousness, leading to a
loose, changeable and unfocussed stream of activated memories,
thoughts and perceptions, in part as a result of the attenuation
of executive functions during sleep (e.g., Maquet, 2000). The
activation of disparate memory elements, hyperassociates, and
their re-combination into novel permutations gives rise to the
relatively bizarre and improbable events within single dream
images. Repeated activation of elements during sleep, typically
depicting recently-learned information or experiences, is widely
considered to result in the consolidation of the activated elements
(Born and Wilhelm, 2012).
The novelty of this model is that (i) dreaming directly reflects
the processes of sleep-dependent memory consolidation, (ii)
memories or information can be consolidated if merely related to
an experience (via hyperassociativity), rather than being directly
experienced, (iii) AM provides an account of the engagement of
the whole declarative memory system, as opposed to necessitating
episodic and semantic memories to be consolidated via different
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TABLE 1 | Application of the autobiographical memory consolidation model: child’s dream.
Waking experience Associated dream Consolidated features
(i) Watching Monsters Inc. film in which monsters scare
children in their bedrooms. Watching from my sofa in my
living room, with baby sister and mother. This activates
associated thoughts of scary creatures, such as a dragon
from a favorite story book.
(ii) Sat on Grandma’s knee in her chair, playing a new game
on Grandma’s tablet. The object of the game is to fit
puzzle shapes into a template. It makes a noise when the
correct pieces are placed. This activates associated
thoughts of photographs on the tablet, Grandma’s cats
(sat nearby) and feelings of mastery when I accomplish
the puzzle.
A monster (like the main character in the film) scares me in my
bed. I am very frightened. I want to leave but I have to complete
a puzzle to escape. I have to try several times but I can’t fit the
last piece. I wake up just as the monster reaches me. This
activates several hyperassociated elements such as being afraid
of other specific film characters (who are usually friendly), being
lost inside the tablet and seeing various shapes (within the
puzzle).
Ability to fit the puzzle pieces
together. Monsters can be scary.
The dream report has been taken from a 2.5-year-old child. The waking experiences have been provided by the child’s mother and the hyperassociated elements are hypothesized.
TABLE 2 | Application of the autobiographical memory consolidation model: adult’s dream.
Waking experience Associated dream Consolidated features
(i) Sat at the computer at my desk in my office, preparing for
an upcoming presentation on memory to a non-specialist
audience. Trying to think of examples of procedural
memory that people can relate to. People talking in the
corridor nearby. This activates associated thoughts of
colleagues in the field, the organizer of the presentation
event, and other work projects that require urgent
attention.
(ii) Listening to the radio whilst washing up in the kitchen.
A song by a well-known artist is being played, about a
woman who escapes the daily hassles of her family and
work by getting on a train. This activates associated
thoughts of the singer’s husband (also well-known), own
family commitments (needing to stock up on food to
prepare better meals for the children) and work projects
looming, such as the presentation described above.
Delivering a presentation (from (i)) on memory in a generic
sports hall (an exam location) to people sat in rows behind
small examination desks. The invigilator is the singer’s
husband (from (ii)). I try to pronounce a brain region but
falter several times. The scene shifts to a busy, unfamiliar
road. I’m walking along it, discussing my shopping list with
the singer’s husband again. We walk past his wife and
wave. Several hyperassociated elements are activated,
such as examination fears of nervousness, lack of
preparation, brain regions I’ve been reading recently and
images of the (unfamiliar) authors of related papers, hustle
and bustle from the busy road, a memory of a newsagents
from childhood, thoughts about my baby daughter’s ability
to wave when she recognizes someone: : :
Representation of the film character
consolidates recognition of their face
and voice. A need to shop for food for
the children. Examples of procedural
memory needed for the presentation. A
need to prepare the presentation so to
avoid being nervous, and faltering. (The
emotional context has been removed.)
The waking experiences and the dream report have been taken from the first author’s own experiences.
processes, and (iv) the fragmentation of AMs during sleep
serves the function of decontextualizing them, rendering salient
elements more easily integrated into existing networks, thus
consolidating them efficiently.
Waking experiences are presented along with few associated
thoughts and information, indicating a small degree of
associated activation within focused, waking cognition. The
consequential dream experience incorporates elements of the
waking experiences, along with some new information and thus
comprises novel permutations of the original AMs. Each dream
element leads to activation of hyperassociated information. The
subsequently consolidated features are those that have been
repeatedly activated. These features may have been experienced
in waking, in the dream or as associations of any element of these.
There is therefore overlap between the original experiences,
dreams, and consolidated features, in line with the constructive
AM system. Figure 1 presents a schematic of these processes.
We can provide illustrations of how this may work using related
waking and dreaming thoughts, as depicted inTable 1. The child’s
dream exemplifies the typical emotionality of recalled dreams and
how procedural and episodic elements can be combined within
dream content, leading to independently consolidated features.
Table 2 presents an adult dream, depicting more mundane
experiences and thoughts from daily life, reflective of more
systematically-sampled dream content. The dream relates to the
two waking life experiences and merges features of them, whilst
individual elements of the waking life experiences have been
broken down. The consolidated features arise from the repeatedly
activated elements of the waking life experiences, the dream and
the hyperassociations of the dream elements.
Predictions of the Model
The AM consolidation model emphasizes the continuity between
AM and dreaming cognition, as such there should be more
similarities than differences between the activation of memories
and thoughts dreaming and waking. In addition a major testable
claim of ourmodel is that themore something appears in a dream,
the better consolidated and integrated into existing networks that
should be.
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As dreaming depends crucially on AM, those with AM
impairment should also see a reduction in dreaming and
impairments in consolidation. We believe that these propositions
fit with standard models of both retrograde (with respect to the
former) and anterograde (with respect to the latter) amnesia.
Furthermore retrograde amnesics should be able to dream, but
would likely only dream of recent experiences, if their accessibility
of more remote memories is impaired across sleep as well as
wake. Anterograde amnesics should likely only dream of older
experiences, though there may well be methodological challenges
with sampling dream reports from such patients.
We acknowledge the methodological challenges associated
with testing some of these claims but recognize that paradigms are
developing that aim to demonstrate links between dream content,
whether direct or metaphorical representations are incorporated,
and subsequent consolidation (Horton, unpublished data;
Wamsley et al., 2010b).
Methodological Note Concerning Sleep vs
Dreaming
We wish to emphasize that we are not proposing that dreaming,
per se, is a necessary and sufficient part of the memory
consolidation process. Rather dreaming may reflect the processes
of offline memory activation that leads to consolidation. Any
mental content during sleep can give rise to the experience
of having dreamt, providing waking occurs soon after and
interference does not occur (Parke and Horton, 2009).Whilst
these hypotheses are compelling, the data presented are largely
preliminary and the field is still expanding. In particular the
links between the sleep mentation and the nature of what exactly
is being consolidated needs to be further refined. Nevertheless
these data imply that there is something predictable about
the nature of the sleep–wake cycle in relation to memory
consolidation function. Animal studies are clearer here, although
a review of these go beyond the scope of the present paper
(however for a useful summary see Ribeiro and Nicolelis, 2004).
Data from experimental studies also suggest that there is more
continuity than discontinuity between memory functioning and
consciousness across sleep and wake (e.g., Schredl and Hofmann,
2003). Similarly, some preliminary data has hinted that the
content of daydreams can be directly linked to the subsequent
improvement in a procedural dart-throwing task (Miller and
Horton, unpublished data). These data provide evidence of
the continuity of mental content as a reflection of procedural
learning. The challenge is to integrate a theoretical explanation
for this with the wealth of evidence underpinning current
conceptions of sleep-dependent memory consolidation processes,
which typically see sleep as providing an environment that
differs substantially from waking functionality. It is essential
to operationalize dreaming more specifically in order to enable
predictions to be made about the continuity of cognitive
processing across sleep and wake (Schredl and Hofmann,
2003).
We should also reiterate that we assume that the incorporation
of AMs into dreams reflects the activation of AMs within the
sleeping brain in a generally direct manner. That is, if something
appears in a dream we deem it to be representative of some
associated waking life experience. Whilst these manifestations
may appear metaphorically or in a loosely associated manner, we
should acknowledge that there exists some alternative theories
of dreaming, which postulate that the representation of waking
experiences into dreams are a compensation for the lack of
conscious consideration during wake (e.g., Jung, 1934, 1948a,b).
Freud also argued for dream content being far less reflective of
waking life in his theory of repression.
Individual Differences, Implications for
Creativity, and Clinical Considerations
The hyperassociative cognition typical of REM sleep can promote
creativity and insight (e.g., Ritter et al., 2012). Yet disturbed sleep
can lead to greater dissociation, also resulting in greater creativity
(vanHeugten-van derKloet et al., 2015). How can these seemingly
opposing views be aligned?
Disturbed sleep is recognized as a correlate ofmost diagnosable
mental illnesses, both psychotic and neurotic/emotional in nature.
As some individuals show a tendency toward creativity in waking
it would follow, in line with the continuity hypothesis and its
emphasis on holistic functioning over the full cycle of sleep
and wake, that some individuals may be particularly affected
by sleep’s hyperassociative cognition. Some researchers have
investigated these ideas with regards to creativity and psychosis
(e.g., Llewellyn, 2011). In non-clinical contexts, “healthy” sleep
can promote creativity in relation to problem solving, as novel
insight results from hyperassociative cognition during sleep
(Stickgold et al., 1999). When sleep is more disturbed dissociation
can result, which in turn can lead to creative thinking. This creates
a U-shaped relationship between sleep quantity and creativity.
The question therefore remains as to how this may affect memory
consolidation.
One could argue that the greater the fragmentation of
autobiographical experiences during sleep, resulting in part from
hyperassociative cognition, the greater the experience of dream
bizarreness and subsequent creativity in waking. Such processing
would also lead to greater de-contextualization of a remembered
memory source, subsequently increasing its retrievability across
different situations. According to our view this reflects an
efficient mode of AM consolidation, resulting from obtaining
non-disturbed sleep.
We propose that disturbed sleep would lead to impaired AM
functioning. As AM comprises both memories about one’s own
life as well as a cognitive self, we hypothesize that disturbed sleep
would impact on both the retrievability of AMs as well as the
stability of the self.
Conclusion
We have presented a model of AM functioning across sleep and
wake, such that memory sources of autobiographical experiences
are fragmentarily activated during sleep and re-bound with other
memory sources, as manifested via bizarre combinations of
experiences in dreams. The rebinding of memory sources occurs
when the brain enters a hyperassociative, reflexive state during
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both REM and non-REM sleep. Such processes are proposed to
be reflective of sleep-dependent memory consolidation. There are
therefore benefits of such hyperassociative and creative cognitive
processing, as under the right conditions, they can lead to
de-contextualization of experiences and subsequent increased
accessibility of a memory.
This is the first time that AM, engaging both the semantic
and episodic (declarative) memory systems, has been proposed to
account for the activation of hippocampal–cortical regions during
sleep. We argue that studying the composition of dreams provides
a useful methodological tool for further exploring the cognitive
processes of sleep-dependent memory consolidation.
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